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FEATURES OF THE 
WAR 



By 



FIELD MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG 



1919 




V/ASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1919 



War Department 

Docnmer.t Xn. 952 

Office of The Adjutant General 









WAE DEPARTMENT, 

Washington, August 22, 1919. 

The following report of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig on the 
" Features of the War "' is iDublished for the information of all con- 
cerned. 

[002.1, A. G. O.] 

By order of the Secretary or War : 

PEYTON C. MARCH, 

General, Chief of Staff. 
Official : 

P. C. PIARRIS, 

The Adjutant General. 

3 



FIELD MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG ON THE 
"FEATURES OF THE WAR." 

TRANSCRIPT. 

[From the Fourth Supplement to The London Gazette of Tuesday, Apr. 8, 1919.] 



[We are departing in this instance from our usual practice of publishing extracts from 
dispatches only in the Supplement to Royal Engineers Journal and reproduce helow Part II 
of Sir Douglas liaig's final dispatch, since it furnishes a general review of the whole 
war. — Editob^ U. E. Journal.] 

(10) In this, my final dispatcli, I tliink it desirable to comment 
briefly upon certain general features which concern the whole series 
of operations carried out under my command. I am urged thereto 
by the con^•iction that neither the course of the war itself nor the 
military lessons to be drawn therefrom can properly be compre- 
hended, unless the long succession of battles commenced on the Somme 
in 1916 and ended in November of last year on the Sambre are viewed 
as forming part of one great and continuous engagement. 

To direct attention to any single phase of that stupendous and in- 
cessant struggle and seek in it the explanation of our success, to the 
exclusion or neglect of other phases possibly less striking in their im- 
mediate or obvious consequences is, in my opinion, to risk the forma- 
tion of unsound doctrines regarding the character and requirements 
of modern war. 

If the operations of the past four and a half years are regarded 
as a single continuous campaign, there can be recognized in them the 
same general features and the same necessary stages which between 
forces of approximately equal strength have marked all the con- 
clusive battles of history. There is in the first instance the prelimi- 
nary stage of the campaign in which the opposing forces seek to de- 
ploy and maneuver for position, endeavoring while doing so to gain 
some early advantage which might be pushed home to quick decision. 
This phase came to an end in the present war with the creation of 
continuous trench lines from the Swiss frontier to the sea. 

Battle having been joined, there follows the period of real .struggle 
in which the main forces of the two belligerent armies are pitted 
against each other in close and costly combat. Each commander 
seeks to wear down the power of resistance of his opponent and to 
pin him to his position, vchile preserving or accumulating in his own 
hands a poAverful reserve force with which he can maneuver, and 
when signs of the enemy becoming morally and physically weakened 
are observed, deliver the decisive attack. The greatest possible pres- 
sure against the enemy's whole front must be maintained, especially 
when the crisis of the battle approaches. Then every man, horse, and 
gun is required to cooperate, so as to complete the enemy's overthrow 
and exploit success, 

5 



6 FEATURES OF THE WAR. 

In the stage of the wearing out struggle losses will necessarily be 
heavy on both sides, for in it the ]3rice of victory is paid. If the op- 
posing forces are approximately equal in numbers, in courage, in 
morale, and in equipment, there is no way of avoiding payment of 
the price or of eliminating this phase of the struggle. 

In former battles this stage of the conflict has rarelj^ lasted more 
than a few days, and has often been completed in a few hours. When 
armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of great Empires 
behind them, it will inevitably be long. It will include violent crises 
of fighting which, when viewed separately and apart from the gen- 
eral perspective, will appear individually as great indecisive battles. 
To this stage belong the great engagements of 1916 and 1917 which 
wore down the strength of the German armies. 

Finally, whether from the superior fighting ability and leadership 
of one of the belligerents, as the result of greater resources or ten- 
acity, or by by reason of higher morale, or from a combination of all 
these causes, the time will come when the other side will begin to 
weaken and the climax of the battle is reached. Then the commander 
of the weaker side must choose whether he will break off the engage- 
ment, if he can, while there is yet time, or stake on a supreme effort 
what reserves remain to him. The launching and destruction of Na- 
poleon's last reserves at Waterloo was a matter of minutes. In this 
World War the great sortie of the beleaguered German armies com- 
menced on March 21, 1918, and lasted for four months, j^et it rep- 
resents a corresponding stage in a single colossal battle. 

The breaking down of such a supreme effort will be the signal for 
the commander of the successful side to develop his greatest strength 
and seek to turn to immediate account the loss in material and morale 
which their failure must inevitably produce among his opponent's 
troops. In a battle joined and decided in the course of a few days 
or hours, there is no risk that the lay observer will seek to distinguish 
the culminating operations by which victory is seized and exploited 
from the preceding stages by which it has been made possible and 
determined. If the whole operations of the present war are regarded 
in correct perspective, the victories of the summer and autumn of 
1918 will be seen to be as directly dei^endent upon the two years of 
stubborn fighting that preceded them. 

(11) If the causes which determined the length of the recent con- 
test are examined in the light of the accepted principles of war, it 
will be seen that the duration of the struggle was governed by and 
bore a direct relation to certain definite factors which are enumerated 
below. 

In the first place, we were unprepared for war, or at any rate for 
a war of such magnitude. We were deficient in both trained men 
and military material, and, what was more -important, had no ma- 
chinery ready by which either men or material could be produced 
in anything approaching the requisite quantities. The consequences 
were twofold. Firstly, the necessary machinery ha.d to be impro- 
vised hurriedly, and improvization is never economical and seldom 
satisfactory. In this case the high-water mark of our fighting 
strength in infantry was only reached after two and a half years 
of conflict, by which time heavy casualties had already been incurred. 
In consequence, the full man power of the Empire was never de- 
veloped in the field at any period of the war. 



FEATURES OF THE WAR. 7 

As regards material, it Avas not until midsummer, 191G, that the 
artillery situation became even approximately adequate to the con- 
duct of major operations. Throughout the Somme Battle the ex- 
penditure of artillery ammunition had to be watched with the 
greatest care. During the battles of 1917 ammunition was plentiful, 
but the gun situation was a source of constant anxiety. Only in 1918 
was it possible to conduct artillery operations independently of any 
limiting consideration other than that of transport. 

The second consequence of our unpreparedness was that our armies 
were unable to intervene either at the outset of the war or until 
nearly two years had elapsed, in sufficient strength adequately to 
assist our Allies. The enemy Avas able to gain a notable initial ad- 
vantage by establishing himself in Belgium and northern France, 
and throughout the early stages of the war was free to concentrate 
an undue proportion of his effectives against France and Eussia. 
The excessive burden thrown upon the gallant Army of France dur- 
ing this period caused them losses, the effect of which has been felt 
all through the war and directly influenced its length. Just as at no 
time were we as an Empire able to put our own full strength into 
the field, so at no time were the Allies as a whole able completely to 
develop and obtain the full effect from their greatly sujDerior man 
power. What might have been the effect of British intervention on 
a larger scale in tlie earlier stages of the war is shown by what was 
actually achieved by our original expeditionary force. 

It is interesting to note that in previous campaigns the side which 
has been fully prepared for war has almost invariabW gained a rapid 
and complete success over its less well prepared opponent. In 1866 
and 1870, Austria, and then France, were overwhelmed at the outset 
by means of superior preparation. The initial advantages derived 
therefrom were followed up by such vigorous and ruthless action, 
regardless of loss, that there was no time to recover from the first 
stmming blows. The German plan of campaign in the present war 
Avas undoubtedly based on similar principles. The margin by which 
the German onrush in 1914 Avas stemmed was so narrow and the sub- 
sequent struggle so severe that the Avord " miraculous '' is hardly too 
strong a term to describe the recovery and ultimate victory oi the 
Allies. 

A further cause adversely influencing the duration of the war on 
the Avestern front during its later stages, and one f olloAving indirectly 
from that just stated, Avas the situation in other theaters. The mili- 
tary strength of Russia broke down in 1917 at a critical period, Avhen, 
had she been able to carry out her military engagements, the war 
might have been shortened by a year. At a later date, the military 
situation in Italy in the autumn of 1917 necessitated the transfer of 
five British divisions from France to Italy, at a time Avhen their 
presence in France might have had far-reaching effects. 

Thirdly, the Allies were handicapped in their task and the Avar 
thereby lengtheried by the inherent difficulties always associated Avith 
the combined action of armies of separate nationalties, differing in 
speech and temperament, and, not least important, in military organi- 
zation, equipment, and supply. 

_ Finally, as indicated in the opening paragraph of this part of my 
dispatch, the huge numbers of men engaged on either side, Avhereby 
a continuous battle front was rapidly established from SAvitzerland 



8 FEATUEES OP THE WAR. 

10 the sea, outflanking was made impossible and maneuver very 
difficult, necessitated the delivery of frontal attacks. This factor, 
combined with the strength of the defensive under modern condi- 
tions, rendered a protracted wearing out battle unavoidable before 
the enemy's power of resistance could be overcome. So long as the 
opposing forces are at the outset approximately equal in numbers 
and morale, and there are no flanks to turn, a long struggle for su- 
premacy is inevitable. 

(12) Obviously, the greater the length of a war the higher is likely 
to be the number of casualties incurred in it on either side. The same 
causes, therefore, which served to protract the recent struggle are 
largely responsible for the extent of our casualties. Therecan be no 
question that to our general unpreparedness must be attributed the 
loss of many thousands of brave men whose sacrifice we deeply de- 
plore, while we regard their splendid gallantry and self-devotion 
with unstinted admiration and gratitude. 

Given, however, the military situation existing in August, 1914, our 
total losses in the war have been no larger than were to be expected. 
Neither do they compare unfavorably with those of any other of the 
belligerent nations, so far as figures are available, from which com- 
parison can be made. The total British casualties in all theaters of 
war, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, including native troops, 
are approximately three millions (3,076,388) . Of this total some two, 
and a half millions (2,568,834) were incurred on the western front. 
The total French losses, killed, missing, and prisoners, but exclusive 
of wounded, have been given officially as approximately 1,831,000. 
If an estimate for wounded is added, the total can scarcely be less 
than 4,800,000, and of this total it is fair to assume that over four 
millions were incurred on the western front. The published figures 
for Italy, killed and wounded only, exclusive of prisoners, amount to 
1,400,000, of which practically the whole were incurred in the western 
theater of war. 

Figures have also been published for Germany and Austria. The 
total German casualties, killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, are 
given at approximately six and a half millions (6,485,000), of which 
the vastly greater proportion must have been incurred on the western 
front, where the bulk of the German forces were concentrated and 
the hardest fighting took place. In view of the fact, however, that 
' the number of German prisoners is definitely known to be consider- 
ably understated, these figures must be accepted with reserve. The 
losses of Austria-Hungary in killed, missing, and prisoners are given 
as approximately two and three-quarter millions (2,772,000). An 
estimate of wounded would give a total of over four and a half 
millions. 

The extent of our casualties, like the duration of the war, was de- 
pendent on certain definite factors which can be stated shortly. 

In the first place, the military situation compelled us, particularly 
during the first portion of the war to make great efforts before we 
had developed our full strength in the field or properly equipped and 
trained our armies. These efforts were wasteful of men, but in the 
circumstances they could not be avoided. The only alternative was 
to do nothing and see our French Allies overwhelmed by the enemy's 
superior numbers. 



FEATURES OF THE WAE. 9 

During llie second half of the Avar, and that part embracing the 
critical and costly period of the wearing out battle, the losses previ- 
ously suffered by our Allies laid upon the British Armies in France 
an increasing share in the burden of attack. From the opening of 
the Sonnne Battle in 1916 to the termination of hostilities the British 
Armies were subjected to a strain of the utmost severity which never 
ceased, and consequently had little or no opportunity for the rest and 
ti'aining they so greatly needed. 

In addition to these particular considerations, certain general fac- 
tors peculiar to modern war made for the inflation of losses. The 
great strength of modern field defenses and the power and precision 
of modern weapons, the multiplication of machine guns, trench mor- 
tars, and artillery of all natures, the emplojaiient of gas, and the 
rapid development of the aeroplane as a formidable agent of destruc- 
tion against both men and material, all combined to increase the price 
to be paid for victor}^ 

If only for these reasons, no comparisons can usefully be made 
between the relative losses incurred in this war and any previous war. 
There is, however, the further consideration that the issues involved 
in this stupendous struggle were far greater than those concerned in 
any other war in recent historj^ Our existence as an Empire and 
civilization itself, as it is understood by the free western nations, 
were at stake. Men fought as they have never fought before in 
masses. 

Despite our own particular handicaps and the foregoing general 
considerations, it is satisfactory to note that, as the result of the 
courage and determination of our troops, and the high level of leader- 
ship generally maintained, our losses even in attack over the Avhole 
period of the battle compare favorably Avith those inflicted on our 
opponents. The approximate total of our battle casualties in all 
arms, and including overseas troops, from the commencement of the 
Somme Battle in 1916 to the conclusion of the armistice is 2,140,000. 
The calculation of German losses is obviously a matter of great diffi- 
culty. It is estimated, iiowever, that the number of casualties in- 
flicted on the enemy by British troojDS during the above period ex- 
ceeds two and a half millions. It is of interest, moreover, in the light 
of the paragraph next following, that more than half the tot-al 
casualties incurred by us in the fighting of 1918 were occasioned dur- 
ing the five months, March-July, when our armies were on the de- 
fensive. 

(13) Closely connected with the question of casualties is that of 
the relative values of attack and defense. It is a view often ex- 
pressed that the attack is more expensive than defense. This is only 
a half statement of the truth. Unquestionabl}^, unsuccessful attack 
is generally more expensive than defense, particularly if the attack 
is pressed home with courage and resolution. On the other hand, 
attack so pressed home, if skillfully conducted, is rarely unsuccessful, 
whereas in its later stages especially, unsuccessful defense is far 
more costly than attack. 

Moreover, the object of all war is victory, and a purely defensive 

attitude can never bring about a successful decision, either in a 

battle or in a campaign. The idea that a war can be won by standing 

on the defensive and waiting for the enemy to attack is a dangerous 

133957°— 19 2 



10 i'EATUEES OF THE WAR. 

fallacy, which owes its inception to the desire to evade the price of 
victory. It is an axiom that decisive success in battle can be gained 
only by a vigorous offensive. The principle here stated has long been 
recognized as being fundamental and is based on the universal teach- 
ing of military history in all ages. The course of the present war 
has proved it to be correct. 

To pass for a moment from the general to the particular, and con- 
sider in the light of the present war the facts upon which this axiom 
is based. 

A defensive role sooner or later brings about a distinct lowering 
of the morale of the troops, who imagine that the enemj^ must be 
the better man, or at lea^t more numerous, better equipped with and 
better served by artillery or other mechanical aids to victory. Onco 
the mass of the defending infantry become possessed of such ideas, 
the battle is as good as lost. An army fighting on enemy soil, especi- 
ally if its standard of discipline is high, may maintain a successful 
defense for a protracted period, in the hope that victory may be 
gained elsewhere or that the enemy may tire or weaken in his resolu- 
tion and accept a compromise. The resistance of the German Armies 
was undoubtedly prolonged in this fashion, but in the end the per- 
sistence of our troops had its natural effect. 

Further, a defensive policy involves the loss of the initiative, with 
all the' consequent disadvantages to the defender. The enemy is able 
to choose at his own convenience the time and place of his attacks. 
Not being influenced himself by the threat of attack from his oppon- 
ent, he can afford to take risks, and by greatly weakening his front 
in some places can concentrate an overwhelming force elsewhere 
with which to attack. The defender, on the other hand, becomes al- 
most entirely ignorant of the dispositions and plans of his opponent, 
who is thus in a position to effect a surprise. This was clearly exem- 
plified during the fighting of 1918. As long as the enemy was attack- 
ing, he obtained fairly full information regarding our dispositions. 
Captured documents show that, as soon as he was thrown once more 
on the defensive and the initiative returned to the Allies, he was kept 
in comparative ignorance of our plans and dispositions. The conse- 
quence was that the Allies were able to effect many surprises, both 
strategic and tactical. 

As a further effect of the loss of the initiative and ignorance of 
his opponent's intentions, the defender finds it difficult to avoid a 
certain dispersal of his forces. Though for a variety of reasons, in- 
cluding the fact that we had lately been on the offensive, we were by 
no means entirely ignorant of the enemy's intentions in the spring 
of 1918, the unavoidable uncertainty resulting from a temporary 
loss of the initiative did have the effect of preventing a complete con- 
centration of our reserves behind the point of the enemy's attack. 

An additional reason, peculiar to the circumstances of the present 
war, which in itself compelled me to refuse to adopt a purely defen- 
sive attitude so long as any other was open to me, is to be found in 
the geographical position of our armies. For reasons stated by me 
in my dispatch of July 20, 1918, we could not afford to give much 
ground on any part of our front. The experience of the war has 
shown that if the defense is to be maintained successfully, even for 
a limited time, it must be flexible. 



FEATURES OF THE WAR. ' 11 

(14) If the vieAYs set out by me in the preceding paragraphs are 
accepted, it will be recognized that the war did not follow any unprec- 
edented course, and that its end was neither sudden nor should it 
have been unexpected. The rapid collapse of Germany's military 
powers in the latter half of 1918 was the logical outcome of the fight- 
ing of the previous two years. It would not have taken place but for 
that period of ceaseless attrition which used up the reserves of the 
German Armies, while the constant and growing pressure of the 
blockade sapped with more deadly insistence from year to year at 
the strength and resolution of the German people. -It is in tlie great 
battles of 1916 and 1917 that we have to seek for the secret of our 
victory in 1918. 

Doubtless, the end might have come sooner had we been able to 
develop the military resources of our Empire more rapidly and with 
a higher degree of concentration, or had not the defection of Russia 
in 1917 given our enemies a new lease of life. 

So far as the military situation is concerned, in spite of the great 
accession of strength which Germany received as the result of the 
defection of Russia, the battles of 1916 and 1917 had so far weak- 
ened her armies that the effort they made in 1918 was insufficient to 
secure victory. Moreover, the effect of the battles of 1916 and 1917 
was not confined to loss of German man power. The moral effects 
of those battles were enormous, both in the German Army and in 
Germany. By their means our soldiers established over the German 
soldier a moral superiority Avhich thej^ held in an ever-increasing 
degree until the end of the war, even in the difficult clays of March 
and April, 1918. 

(15) From time to time as the war of position dragged on and the 
enemy's trench systems remained unbroken, Avhile questions of man 
power and the shortage of shipping became acute, the wisdom or 
necessity of maintaining any large force of mounted men Avas freely 
discussed. In the light of the full experience of the Avar the deci- 
sion to preserve the cavalry corps has been completely justified. It 
has been proved that cavalry, Avhether used for shock effect under 
suitable conditions or as mobile infantry, have still an indisi)ensable 
part to play in modern war. Moreover, it can not safely be assumed 
that in all future wars the flanks of the opposing forces will rest on 
neutral States or impassable obstacles. Whenever such a condition 
does not obtain, opportunities for the use of cavalry must arise 
frequently. 

Throughout the great retirement in 1914 our cavalry covered the 
retirement and protected the flanks of our columns against the onrush 
of the enemj^, and on frequent occasions prevented our infantry from 
being overrun by the enemy's cavalry. Later in the same year at 
Ypres their mobility multiplied their value as a reserve, enabling 
them rapidly to reinforce threatened portions of our line. 

During the critical period of position warfare, Avhen the trial of 
strength between the opposing forces took place, the absence of room 
to maneuver made the importance of cavalry less apparent. Even 
under such conditions, howcA^er, valuable results may be expected 
from the employment of a strong force of cavalry when, after there 
has been severe fighting on one or more fronts, a surprise attack is 
made on another front. Such an occasion arose in the operations before 



12 FEATUKES OE THE WAE. 

Cambrai at tlie close of 1917, when the cavahy were of the greatest 
service; while throughout the whole period of trench fighting they 
constituted an important mobile reserve. 

At a later date, when circumstances found us operating once more 
in comparatively open country, cavalry proved themselves of value 
in their true role. During the German offensive in March, 1918, the 
superior mobility of cavalry fully justified their existence. At the 
commencement of the battle cavalry were used under the fifth army 
over wide fronts. So great, indeed, became the need for mounted men 
that certain units which had but recently been dismounted were hur- 
riedly provided with horses and did splendid service. Frequently, 
when it was impossible to move foi'ward other troops in time, our 
mounted troops were able to fill gaps in our line and restore the 
situation. The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a 
marked feature of the battle. Had the German command had at 
their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a 
wedge might have been driven between the French and British 
Armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly 
to the difficulties of our task. 

In the actions already referred to east of Amiens, the cavalry were 
again able to demonstrate the great advantage which their power 
of rapid concentration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in 
close concert with both armored cars and infantry, they pushed 
ahead of the latter and by anticipating the arrival of German re- 
serves assisted materially in our success. In the battle of October 8 
they were responsible for saving the Cambrai-Le Cateau-St. Quentin 
Eailway from complete destruction. Finally, during the culminat- 
ing operations of the war when the German Armies were falling back 
in disorganized masses a new situation arose which demanded the 
use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, pressing hard upon the 
enemy's heels, hastened his retreat and threw him into worse con- 
fusion. At such a time the moral effect of cavalry is overwhehning 
and is in itself a sufficient reason for the retention of that arm. 

On the morning of the armistice, two British cavalry divisions 
were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the orders to stop 
reached them they had already gained a line 10 miles in front of 
our infantrj^ outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of 
the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganized re- 
treat would have been turned into a rout. 

(16) A remarkable feature of the present war has been the num- 
ber and variety of mechanical contrivances to which it has given 
birth or has brought to a higher state of perfection. 

Besides the great increase in mobility made possible by the develop- 
ment of motor transport, heavy artillery, trench mortars, machine 
guns, aeroplanes, tanks, gas, and barbed wire have in their several 
spheres of action played very prominent parts in operations, and as 
a whole have given a greater driving power to war. The belligerent 
possessing a preponderance of such mechanical contrivances has 
found himself in a very favorable position as compared with his less 
well provided opponent. The general superiority of the Allies in this 
direction during the concluding stages of the recent struggle un- 
doubtedly contributed powerfully to their success. In this respect 
the army owes a great debt to science and to the distinguished 



FEATURES OF THE WAR. 13 

scientific men who placed their learning and skill at the disposal of 
their countr}^ 

It should never be forgotten, however, that weapons of this char- 
acter are incapable of effective independent action. They do not in 
themselves possess the power to obtain a decision, their real function 
being to assist the infantry to get to grips with tlieir opponents. To 
place in them a reliance out of proportion to their real utility, to 
imagine, for example, that tanks and aeroplanes can take the place 
of infantry and artillery, would be to do a disservice to those who 
have the future of these new weapons most at heart by robbing them 
of tlie power to use them to their best elfect. 

EA'ery mechanical device so far produced is dependent for its most 
effective upon the closest possible association with other arms, 
and in particular with infantry and artillery. Aeroplanes must rely 
upon infantry to prevent the enemy from overrunning their aero- 
dromes, and, despite their increasing range and versatility of action, 
are clearly incapable in themselves of bringing about a decision. 
Tanks require the closest artillery support to enable them to reach 
their objectives without falling victims to the enemy's artillery, raid 
are dependent upon the infantry to hold the position they have won. 

As an instance of the interdependence of artillery and tanks, we 
ma}^ take the actions fought east of Amiens on August 8, 1918, and 
following daj^s. A very large number of tanks were eniployed in 
these operations, and they carried out their tasks in the most brilliant 
manner. Yet a scrutiny of the artillery ammunition returns for this 
period discloses the fact that in no action of similar dimensions had 
the expenditure of ammunition been so great. 

Immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they can 
not by themselves decide a campaign. Their true role is that of 
assisting the infantryman, Avhich they have done in a most admirable 
manner. They can not replace him. Only by the rifle and bayonet 
of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won. 

(17) This war has given no new principles; but the different me- 
chanical appliances above mentioned — and in particular the rapid 
improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense 
numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast 
quantities of barbed wire as effective oJDstacles, the enormous expan- 
sion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor trans- 
port — have introduced new problems of considerable complexity 
concerning the effective cooperation of the different arms and services. 
Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new de- 
vices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery al- 
ready working. 

The development of the air service is a niiatter of general knowledge, 
and figures showing something of the work done by our airmen were 
included in my last dispatch. The combining of their operations 
with those of the other arms, and particularly of the artillery, has 
been the subject of constant study and experiment, giving results of 
the very highest value. As regards machine guns, from a proportion 
of 1 gun to approximately 500 infantrymen in 1914, our establish- 
ment of machine guns and Lewis guns had risen at the end of 1918 to 
1 machine gun or Lewis gun to approximately 20 infantrymen. This 
great expansion was necessarily accompanied by a modification of 



14 FEATURES OF THE WAE. 

training^ and methods both for attack and defense, and resulted ulti- 
mately in the establishment of the machine-gun corps under an 
inspector general. 

During the same period, the growth of our artillery was even more 
remarkable, its numbers and power increasing out of all proportion 
to the experience of previous wars. The 486 pieces of light and 
medium artillery with which we took the field in August, 1914, were 
represented at the date of the armistice by 6,437 guns and howitzers 
of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest caliber. 

This vast increase so profoundly influenced the employment of 
artillery and was accompanied by so intimate an association with 
other arms and services that it merits special comment. 

In the first place, big changes were required in artillery organiza- 
tion, as well as important decisions concerning the proportions in 
which the different natures of artillery and artillery amnumition 
should be manufactured. These changes and decisions were made 
during 1916, and resulted in the existing artillery organization of the 
British armies in France. 

In order to gain the elasticity essential to the quick concentration of 
gTins at the decisive point, to enable the best use to be made of them, 
and to facilitate ammunition supply and fire control, artillery com- 
manders, acting under army and corps commanders, were introduced, 
and staffs provided for them. This enabled the large concentrations 
of guns required for our offensives to be quickly absorbed and effi- 
ciently directed. The proportions required of guns to howitzers and 
of the lighter to the heavier natures were determined by certain fac- 
tors, namely the problem of siting in the comparatively limited areas 
available the great numbers of pieces required for an offensive; the 
"lives" of the different types of guns and howitzers, that is the num- 
ber of rounds which can be fired from them before they become un- 
serviceable from wear, and questions of relative accuracy and fire 
effect upon particular kinds of targets. 

The results attained by the organization established in 1916 is in 
itself strong evidence of the soundness of the principles upon which 
it was based. It made possible a high degree of elasticity, and by 
the full and successful exploitation of all the means placed at its dis- 
posal by science and experience, insured that the continuous artillery 
battle which began on the Somme should culminate, as it did, in the 
defeat of the enemy's gims. 

The great development of air photography, sound ranging, flash 
spotting, air-burst ranging, and aerial observation brought counter- 
battery work and harassing fire both by day and night to a high 
state of perfection. Special progress was made in the art of engag- 
ing moving targets with fire controlled by observation from aero- 
IDlanes and balloons. The work of the field survey sections in the 
location of hostile battery positions by resection and the employment 
of accurate maps was brought into extended use. In combination 
with the work of the calibration sections in the accurate calibration 
of guns and by careful calculation of corrections of range required 
to compensate for weather conditions it became possible to a large 
extent to dispense with registration, whereby the chance of effecting 
surprise was greatly increased. In the operations east of Amiens on 
August 8, 1918, in which over 2,000 guns were employed, practically 



FEATURES OF THE WAR, 15 

the whole of the batteries concentrated for the pvirpose of the attack 
opened fire for the first time on the actual morning of the assault. 

The use of smoke shell for covering the advance of our infantry and 
masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with 
increasing frequency and etfect. New forms of gas shell were made 
available, and their combination with the infantry attack carefully 
studied. The invention of a new fuze known as " 106," which was first 
used in the Battle of Arras, 1917, enabled wire entanglements to be 
easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our methods of attack- 
ing organized positions. By bursting the shell the instant it touched 
the ground and before it had become buried, the destructive effect oi 
the explosion was greatly increased. It became possible to cut wire 
with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the factor of 
surprise was given a larger part in operations. 

Great attention w^as Daid to the training of personnel, and in par- 
ticular the Chapperton Down Artillery School, Salisbury Plain, was 
formed for training artillery brigade commanders and battery com- 
manders, while artillery schools in France were organized for the 
training of subalterns and noncommissioned officers. 

A short examination of our principal attacks will give a good idea 
of the increasing importance of artillery. On the first day of the 
Somme Battle of 1916 the number of artillery personnel engaged was 
equal to about half the infantry strength of the attacking divisions. 
On this one day a total of nearly 13,000 tons of artillery ammunition 
was fired by us on the western front. Our attacks at Arras and Mes- 
sines on April 9 and June T, 1917, saw the total expenditure of artil- 
lery annnunition nearly doubled on the first days of those battles, 
while the proportion of artillery personnel to infantry steadily grew. 
During the period following the opening of the Somme Battle, the 
predominance of our artillery over that of the enemy gradually in- 
creased, till at the time of the Arras Battle it had reached a maxi- 
mum. In the course of the summer and autumn of 1917, however, the 
enemy constantly reinforced his artillery on our front, being enabled 
to do so owing to the relaxation of pressure elsewhere. 

The Battle of Ypres in the autumn of 1917 was one of intense 
struogle for artillery supremacy. By dint of reducing his artillery 
strength on other parts of the western front, and by bringing guns 
from the east, the enemy definitely challenged the predominance of 
our artillery. In this battle, therefore, the proportion of our artillery 
to infantry ^strength was particularly large. In the opening attack on 
Julv 31 our artillery personnel amounted to over 80 per cent of the 
infantry engaged in the principal attack on our front, and our total 
expenditure of artillery ammunition on this day exceeded 23,000 
tons. During the succeeding weeks the battle of the rival artilleries 
became ever more violent. 'On the two days, September 20 and 21, 
about 42,000 tons of artillery ammunition were expended by us, and 
in the successful attack of October 4, which gave us the main ridge 
about Broodseinde, our artillery personnel amounted to 85 per cent 
of the infantry engaged in the assault. 

During the winter of 1917-18 the enemy so greatly added to his 
artillery strength by batteries brought from the Kussian front that in 
his spring offensive he w^as able temporarily to effect a definite local 
artillery superiority. This state of affairs was short-lived. Even be- 



16 FEATUKES OF THE WAR. 

fore the breakdown of the German offensive, our guns had regained 
the upper hand. In the battles later in the year the superiority of our 
batteries once more grew rapidly, until the defeat of the German 
artillery became an accomplished fact. From the commencement of 
our offensive in August, 1918, to the conclusion of the armistice, some 
700,000 tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the British 
armies on the western front. For the fortnight from August 21 to 
September 3 our average daily expenditure exceeded 11,000 tons, 
while for the three days of crucial battle on the 27th, 28th, and 29th 
of September nearly 65,000 tons of ammunition were fired by our 
artillery. 

The tremendous growth of our artillery strength above described 
followed inevitably from the character of the wearing out battle 
upon which we were engaged. The restricted opportunities for 
maneuver and the necessity for frontal attacks made the employ- 
ment of great masses of artillery essential. 

The massing of the guns alone, however, could not have secured suc- 
cess without the closest possible combination between our batteries 
and the infantry they were called upon to support, as well as with 
the other arms. The expansion was accompanied, therefore, by a 
constant endeavor to improve the knowledge of all ranks of both 
artillery and infantry and the air service concerning the work and 
possibilities of the other arms. 

An intelligent understanding of "the other man's job" is the first 
essential of successful cooperation. To obtain the best results from 
the vast and complex machine composing a modern army, deep study 
of work other than one's own is necessary for all arms. For this study 
much time is needed, as well as much practical application of the 
principles evolved, and for reasons already explained, opportunity 
sufficient for adequate training could not be found. None the less, the 
best possible use was made of such opportunities as offered, and much 
was in fact accomplished. 

(18) As a natural corollary to the general increase of our forces, 
the signal service, required alike for the proper coordination of 
supply and for the direction and control of the battle, has grown 
almost out of recognition. From an original establishment of under 
2,400 officers and men, trained and equipped chiefly for mobile war- 
fare, at the end of 1918 the personnel of the signal service had risen 
to 42,000, fully equipped with all the latest devices of modern science 
to act efficiently under all conditions as the nervous system to the 
whole vast organism of our army. 

The commencement of trench warfare and the greater use of artil- 
lery led to a rapid development of the signal system, which, as fresh 
units were introduced, became more and more elaborate. At the same 
time, the increase in the powder and range of artillery made the 
maintenance of communications constantly more difficult. Many 
miles of deep trenches were dug in which cables containing 50 to 
100 circuits were buried to gain protection from shell fire. The use of 
wireless communication gradually became more widely spread and 
finally constituted part of the signal establishment of all formations 
down to divisions. To provide an alternative method of communi- 
cation with front-line troops, in 1915 carrier pigeons were introduced 
and a special branch of the signal service was formed controlling 



FEATURES OF THE WAR. 17 

ultimately some 20,000 birds. In 1917 a messenger-clog service was 
started for similar purposes and did good work on a number of 
occasions. . 

The expansion of the work of the signal service m the more tor- 
ward areas was accompanied by a similar development on the lines 
of communication, at general headquarters, armies, and corps. Con- 
struction and railway companies were formed and about 1,500 miles 
of main telegraph and telephone routes constructed in the lines of 
communication area alone, in addition to many miles in army areas. 
Provision had to be made for communicating with London, Paris, 
and Marseille, as well as between the different allied headquarters. 
On tlie advance of our forces to the Ehine telephone communication 
was established between general headquarters at Montreuil and 
Cologne. Signal communication entailing the putting up of many 
thousands of miles of wire was provided also for the control of rail- 
way traffic, while to supplement electric communication generally a 
dispatch rider letter service was maintained by motor cyclists. 

The amount of signal traffic dealt with became very great, and on 
the lines of communication alone more than 23,000 telegrams have 
been transmitted in 24 hours. Similarly, at general headquarters 
as many as 9,000 telegrams have been dealt with in 24 hours, besides 
3 400 letters carried hj dispatch riders; and army headquarters has 
handled 10,000 telegrams and 5,000 letters in the same space of time, 
and a corps, 4,500 telegrams and 3,000 letters. In addition to tele- 
grams and letters, there has been at all times a great volume of tele- 
phone traffic. • 1 • 

Something of the extent of the constructional work required, m 
particular to meet the constant changes of the battle line and the 
movement of headquarters, can be gathered from the fact that as 
many as 6,500 miles of field cable have been issued in a single week. 
The average weekly issue of such cable for the whole of 1918 was 
approximately 3,300 miles. . 

(19) The immense expansion of the army from 6 to over 60 in- 
fantry divisions, combined with the constant multiplication of aux- 
iliary arms, called inevitably for a large increase in the size and scope 
of tlie services concerned in the supply and maintenance of our fight- 
ing forces. . 1 c T 

As the army grew and became more complicated the total teedmg 
strength of our forces in France rose until it approached a total of 
2T00,000 men. The vastness of the figures involved in providing 
for their needs will be realized from the following examples. For 
the maintenance of a single division for one day, nearly 200 tons 
dead weight of supplies and stores are needed, representing a ship- 
pino- tonnage of nearly 450 tons. In an army of 2,700,000 men, the 
addition of'l ounce to each man's daily rations involves the carry- 
ing of an extra 75 tons of goods. 

To cope with so great a growth, the number of existing directorates 
had gradually to be added to or their duties extended, with a corre- 
sponding increase in demands for personnel. The supervision of 
ports was intrusted to the directorate of docks, which controlled 
special companies for the transshipping of stores. By the end of 
November, 1918, the number of individual landings m France at 
the various ports managed by us exceeded ten and one-half million 



18 FEATURES OF THE WAR. 

persons. During the 11 months, January to November, 1918, the 
tonnage hmded at these ports averaged some 175,000 per week. 

To the directorate of transport, originally concerned with the 
administi'ation of horse vehicles and pack animals, fell the further 
duty of exploiting mechanical road traction. Despite the employ- 
ment of over 46,700 motor vehicles, including over 30,000 lorries, 
the number of horses and mules rose greatly, reaching a figure ex- 
ceeding 400,000. The replacement, training, and distribution of 
these animals was the duty of directorate of remounts. The direc- 
torate of veterinary services reduced losses and prevented the spread 
of disease, while the inspector of horse feeding and economies in- 
sured that the utmost value was obtained from the forage and gi'aln 
consumed. 

To meet the requirements of mechanical and hoi'se traffic, the up- 
keep or construction of a maximum of some 4,500 miles of roadway 
was intrusted to the directorate of roads. Some idea of the work 
involved may be obtained from the fact that for ordinary upkeep 
alone 100 tons of road material are required per fortnight for the 
maintenance of 1 mile of road. Under this directorate were organ- 
ized a number of road construction companies, together with quarry 
companies to supply the necessary metal. In the month of October, 
1918, over 85,000 tons of road material were conveyed weekly by 
motor transport alone, involving a petrol mileage of over 14,000,000 
weekly. The total output of stone from the commencement of 1918 
to the date of the armistice amounted to some 3,500,000 tons. 

For the working of the existing railways and for the construction 
or repair of many miles of track both normal and narrow gauge, 
railway troops of every description, operating companies, construc- 
tion companies, survey and reconnaissance companies, engine-crew 
companies, workshop companies, wagon-erecting companies, and light 
railway forward comiDanies had to be provided. Under the direc- 
torate of railway traffic, the directorate of constructic-i, and the 
directorate of light railways, these and other technical troops during 
1918 built or reconstructed 2,340 miles of broad-gauge and 1,348 
miles of narrow-gauge railwa3^ Throughout the whole period of 
their operation they guaranteed the smooth and efficient working 
of the railway system. In the six months, May to October, 1918, 
a weekly average of 1,800 trains were run for British Army traffic, 
carrying a weekly average load of approximately 400,000 tons, while 
a further 130,000 tons were carried weekly by our light railways. 
The number of locomotives imported to deal with this traffic rose 
from 62 in 1916 to over 1,200 by the end of 1918, while the number 
of trucks rose from 3,840 to 52,600._ 

The inland water transport section were organized under a sepa- 
rate directorate for the working in France and Flanders of the canal 
and cross-channel barge traffic. 0]i inland waterAvayr; alone ;in aver- 
age of 56,000 tons of material were carried during 1918, the extent of 
waterways worked by us at the date of the armistice Ijeing some 465 
miles. 

The wonderful development of all methods of transportation had 
an important influence upon the course of events. No war has been 
fought with such ample means of quick transportation as were avail- 
able during the recent struggle. Despite the huge increase in the 



FEATURES OF THE WAE. 19 

size of armies, it was possible to effect great concentrations of troops 
witli a speed which, having regard to the numbers of men and bulk of 
material moved, has never before been equaled. Strategic and tacti- 
cal mobility has been the guiding principle of our transportation ar- 
rangements; but this was itself at all times vitally affected by ques- 
tions of supply and by the necessity of providing for the evacuation 
and replacement on a vast scale of the sick and wounded. 

The successful coordination and economic use of all the various 
kinds of transportation requires most systematic management, based 
on deep thought and previous experience. So great was the work en- 
tailed in the handling of the vast quantities of which some few exam- 
ples are given above, so complex did the machinery of transport be- 
come and so important was it that the highest state of efficiency 
should be maintained, that in the autumn of 1916 I was forced to 
adopt an entirely new system for running our lines of communica- 
tion. The appointment of inspector general of communications was 
abolished, and the services previously directed by that officer were 
brought under the immediate control of the adjutant general, the 
quartermaster general, and the director general of transportation. 
The last mentioned was a new office created with a separate staff 
composed for the greater part of civilian experts to deal specifically 
with transportation questions. At the same time, the command and 
administration of the troops on the lines of communication w^ere 
vested in a " general officer commanding the lines of communication 
area." 

The huge bulk of the supplies to be handled was due not merely to 
the size of our army. It arose also from the introduction of new 
weapons and methods of war, and from the establishment of a higher 
standard of comfort for the troops. The incessant demands of the 
fighting forces for munitions were supplied by the directorate of ord- 
nance services, combined with a great expansion of ordnance work- 
shops ; while the directorate of engineering stores provided on a vast 
scale the materials required for the construction of trench defenses 
and kindred purposes. For the comfort and well-being of the troops, 
the directorate of supplies stored and distributed in sound condition 
fresh food, to take the place as far as possible of tinned rations. 
Through the agency of an inspectorate of messing and economies, 
regular schools of cookery gave instruction to nearly 25,000 cooks, 
and careful measures were taken for the recovery of kitchen by- 
products. In August, 1918, over 860,000 pounds of dripping were 
received from armies and consigned to England, while the cash 
value of the by-products disposed of from all sources has exceeded 
£60,000 in a single month. Provision was made for baths, and a new 
inspectorate supervised the running of army laundries on up-to-date 
lines. 

The expeditionary force canteens made it possible to obtain addi- 
tional comforts close up to the front. During 1918, the value of the 
weekly sales in the different canteens averaged eight and one-half mil- 
lion francs. These canteens were valuably supplemented by the vari- 
ous voluntarj^ institutions ministering to the comfort and recreation of 
our troops, such as the Y. M. C. A., the Church Army, the Scottish 
Churches Huts, the Salvation Army, the Soldiers' Christian Associa- 
tion, the Catholic Women's League, and Club Huts, the United Army 



20 FEATURES OF THE WAE. 

and Navy Board, the Wesleyan Soldiers' Institute, and the British 
Soldiers'" Institute. In many cases these organizations carried on 
their work almost in the actual fighting line, and did much to main- 
tain the high morale of our armies. To permit the troops to avail 
themselves "of the opportunities so offered, methods devised by the 
paymaster in chief enabled soldiers to obtain money anywhere in the 
field. Parcels and letters from home have been delivered by the 
army postal service with remarkable regularity. 

As the effects of the enemy submarine warfare began to be felt and 
the shortage of shipping became more and more acute, so it became 
increasingly necessary for the army in France to be more self-sup- 
porting. To meet this emergency vast hospitals and convalescent 
depots capable of accommodating over 22,000 men were erected west 
of the Seine at Trouville. . Additional general hospitals with accom- 
modation for over 7,000 patients were established in the neighbor- 
hood of Boulogne, Etaples, and elsevN^iere. Betvveen January, 1916, 
and November, 1918, the total capacity of hospitals and convalescent 
depots in France grew from under 44,000 to over 157,000 persons. 

Great installations were set up for the manufacture of gun parts 
and articles of like nature, for the repair of damaged material as well 
as for the utilization of the vast quantities of articles of all kinds 
collected from the battlefields by the organization working under the 
direction of the controller of salvage. The forestry directorate, con- 
trolling over 70 Canadian and other forestry companies, worked for- 
ests all over France, in the northwest, central and southwest depart- 
ments, the Vosges, Jura, and Bordeaux country. As the result of its 
work our armies Avere made practically independent of oversea im- 
ported timber. The directorate of agricultural production organized 
farm and garden enterprises for the local supply of vegetables, har- 
vested the crops abandoned by the enemy in his retreat, and com- 
menced the reclamation of the devastated area. 

At the same time a great saving of shipping was effected by the 
speeding up of the work at the docks. The average tonnage discharged 
per hour in port rose from 12^ tons in January, 1917, to 34^ tons in 
July, 1918; while the average number of days lost by ships waiting 
berth at the ports fell from some 90 ship days per week at the begin- 
ning of 1917 to about 9 ship days per week in 1918. 

For the accommodation of so wide a range of services, installations 
of all kinds, hutments, factories, workshops, storage for ammunition, 
clothing, meat and petrol, power houses and pumicing stations, camps 
and hospitals, had to be planned and constructed by the directorate of 
works. Our business relations with the French, the obtaining of sites 
and buildings, called for the establishment of a directorate of hirings 
and requisitions; while my financial adviser in France assisted in 
the adjustment of financial questions connected with the use of 
French railways and harbors, the exploitation of French forests and 
similar matters. The safeguarding from fire of the great number of 
buildings erected or taken over by us and of the masses of accumu- 
lated stores was intrusted to a definite staff under the supervision of 
a fire expert. 

The creation and maintenance of the great organization briefly 
outlined above made big demands upon our available supply of per- 
sonnel. Though these demands so far as possible were met, under 



FEATURES OF THE WAE. 21 

the supervision of the controller of labor, by imported labor or pris- 
oners of war, it was not practicable at any time to supply more than 
a proportion of our needs in this manner. Many fit men who might 
otherwise have reinforced the fighting line had also to be employed, 
especially during the earlier stages of the war. 

As, however, our organization arrived at a greater state of comple- 
tion and its working became smooth, so it began to be possible to 
withdraw considerable numbers of fit men from the rearward serv- 
ices. In many cases it was possible, where replacement was neces- 
sary, to fill the places of the fit men so withdrawn by women or unfit 
men. In this way, when the man-power situation became acute a 
considerable saving was effected. During the great British attacks 
of 1918, of a total male feeding strength of a little over two and one- 
quarter millions, one and one-half millions were in front of railhead. 
Even so, as has been found to be the case in the armies of all other 
belligerents, so in our army the number of fit men employed in the 
rearward services has at all times been large, and necessarily so. 

It is hardly too much to assert that, however seemingly extravagant 
in men and money, no system of supply except the most perfect 
should ever be contemplated. To give a single example, unless our 
supply services had been fully efficient the great advance carried out 
by our armies during the autumn of last year could not have been 
achieved. 

Wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and morale of 
the opposing forces. Morale depends to a very large extent upon the 
feeding and general well-being of the troops. Badly supplied troops 
will invariably be low in morale, and an army ravaged by disease 
ceases to be a fighting force. The feeding and health of the fighting 
forces are dependent upon the rearward services, and so it may be 
argued that with the rearward services rests victory or defeat. In 
our case we can justly say that our supply system has been developed 
into one of the most perfect in the worlcl. 

(20) The preceding paragraph illustrates the demands which the 
conduct of operations made on the stafl^ and directorates controlled 
by the quartermaster general. The parallel development of the ad- 
jutant general's branch, while concerned with matters less patent to 
the casual observer, has been no less remarkable. The problem of 
insuring the supply of reinforcements at the times and places at 
which they will be required to replace casualties is present in all 
warfare, and is difficult in any circumstances. In operations con- 
ducted on the scale reached in this war it is exceedingly intricate. 
The successful solution of this problem alone entitles the adjutant 
general and his staff to the greatest credit. It has formed, however, 
but a small part of their work. 

Owing to the impossibility of foretelling what claims would be 
made on man power by industry or by other theaters of war, it was 
necessary to prepare elaborate forecasts of the personnel lil?:ely to 
be required at various dates, and to work out in advance the best 
manner of utilizing reinforcements in the event of their being avail- 
able in greater or less numbers. We were faced with an unexpected 
contraction in man power in the winter of 1917 and an unexpected 
expansion in the summer of 1918. Both these developments were en- 
countered with a success which could only have been attained by the 



22 FEATURES OF THE WAR. 

greatest forethought and application on the part of the staff con- 
cerned. 

To reduce to cadre a depleted division, to fill it up when men be- 
came available, to break up a battalion and redistribute its personnel, 
to comb out a certain number of fit men from the rearward services, all 
sound simple operations. In reality each requires an immense amount 
of sympathetic treatment and clerical labor, the extent of the work 
involved being instanced by the fact that in the month of April, 
1918, over 200,000 reinforcements were sent up to the fighting forces. 
The carrj'ing out of measures of this nature was made more difficult 
by the continual formation of new types of unit to meet new require- 
ments. It was necessary to find the personnel for those units with the 
least possible dislocation elsewhere, and with an eye to the most ad- 
vantageous employment of the individual in regard to his medical 
category and special qualifications. The following figures will give 
some indication of the magnitude of the task. The adjutant general's 
office at the base has prepared over 8,000,000 records containing the 
military histor}^ of individual soldiers in France, and has received 
and dispatched over 22.000,000 letters. 

Whatever the quality of the troops, a just and efficient administra- 
tion of military law is an indispensable adjunct to a high standard of 
discipline. I gratefully acknowledge the care with which officers of 
the adjutant generars branch in all formations have insured the ob- 
servation of every safeguard which our law provides against injustice. 
They have seen to it that every plea which an accused or convicted 
soldier wishes to bring forward is heard, and that commanders are 
advised as to the suitability of sentences. I take this opportunity of 
recording mj^ satisfaction at the success Avhich has attended the oper- 
ation of the suspension of sentences act. The number of men under 
suspended sentence who by good conduct and gallant service in the 
field have earned remission of their sentence has been most encour- 
aging. 

Closely related to the administration of military law is the work 
of the military police under the provost marshal, and of the military 
prisons in the held. In the battle zone, where frequently they had to 
do duty in exposed positions under heavy fire and suffered severe 
casualties, the militar}- police solved an important puxt of the prob- 
lem of traffic control, by preventing the unavoidable congestion of 
troops and transport on roads in the vicinity of active operations 
from degenerating into confusion. In back areas their vigilance 
and zeal have largely contributed to the good relations maintained 
between our troops and the civilian population. 

Although the number of soldiers undergoing sentences of imprison- 
ment in France has at no time amounted to one per thousand, the 
size of the army has necessitated a considerable expansion of the 
military prisons in the field. The director of military prisons, his 
governors and wardei's have sought, not retribution, but to build up 
the self -discipline of the prisoner. They have been rewarded by 
seeing a large percentage of the men committed to their charge subse- 
quently recover their cliaracters as good soldiers. 

Under the general control of the adjutr.nt general, the base station- 
ery depot, which went to France in 1914 with a personnel of 10, has 
expanded into the directorate of army j^rinting and stationery serv- 
ices, employing over GO officers and 850 other ranks. In addition to 



FEATURES OF THE WAR. 23 

the printing and distribution of orders and instructions, it undertook 
the reproduction on a vast scale of aerial and other photographs, 
the number of which grew from 25,000 in 1916 to two and a quarter 
million in 1918. Other examples of administrative success are the 
prisoners of war section and the directorate of graves registration 
and inquiries. 

Of the care taken for the physical and moral welfare of the troops 
I can not speak too highly. 

In the former domain, the achievements of the director general of 
medical services and his subordinates have been so fully recorded 
by me in previous dispatches that they need no further emphasis. 
It is sufficient to say that, in spite of the numbers dealt with, there 
has been no war in which the resources of science have been utilized 
so generously and successfully for the prevention of disease, or for 
the quick evacuation and careful tending of the sick and wounded. 

In the latter sphere, the devoted efforts of the army chaplains of 
all denominations have contributed incalculably to the building up 
of the indomitable spirit of the army. As the result of their teaching, 
all ranks came to Imow and more fully understand the great and 
noble objects for which they were fighting. 

Under the immediate direction of the adjutant general in matters 
concerning military administration, the principal chaplain for mem- 
bers of all churches except the Church of England, and the deputy 
chaplain general for members of the Church of England administer 
to the greatest harmony a very complete joint organization. Pro- 
vided with a definite establishment for armies, corps, and divisions, 
as well as for the principal base ports, base camps, hospitals, and 
certain other units, they insure that the benefit of religion is brought 
within the reach of every soldier. 

In all the senior offices of this joint organization down to divisions 
the principal chaplain and deputy chaplain general have each their 
representatives, the appointments to those offices in the principal 
chaplain's section being apportioned between the different churches, 
Protestant and Eoman Catholic, in proportion to the numbers of 
their following in the army as a whole. This organization has 
worked for the common good in a manner wholly admirable and 
with a most noteworthy absence of friction. It has undoubtedly been 
much assisted, both in its internal economy and in its relations with 
commanders and troops. By being at all times in direct touch with 
the adjutant general's branch. 

No survey of the features of the war would be complete without 
some reference to the part played by women serving with the British 
Armies in France. Grouped also under the adjutant general's branch 
of the general staff. Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military ISTursing 
Service, the Nursing Sisters of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, 
and of the Australian, New Zealand, South African, and Territorial 
Force Nursing Services and the British Ked Cross Society have 
maintained and embellished a fine tradition of loyalty and efficiency. 
These services have been reinforced by members of Voluntary Aid 
Def:achments from the British Isles, the Oversea Dominions, and the 
United States of America, who have vied with their professional 
sisters in cheerfully enduring fatigue in times of stress and gallantly 
facing danger and death. 



24 FEATURES OF THE WAE. 

Women in the British Eed Cross Society and other organizations 
have driven ambnhmces throughout the war, undeterred by discom- 
fort and hardship. Women liave ministered to the comfort of the 
troops in h.nts and canteens. Finally, Queen Mary's Auxiliary Army 
Corps, recruited on a wider basis, responded with enthusiasm to the 
call for drafts, and by the aid they gave to our declining man power 
contributed materially to the success of our arms. 

(21) The experience gained in this war alone, without the study 
and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns, could not have 
sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have characterized 
the fighting. There was required also the sound basis of military 
knowledge supplied by our training manuals and staff colleges. 

The principles of command, staff work, and organization elabo- 
rated before the war have stood the test imposed upon them and are 
sound. The militarily educated officer has counted for much, and 
the good work done by our staff colleges during the past 30 years 
has had an important influence upon the successful issue of the war. 
In solving the various strategic and tactical problems with which we 
have been faced, in determining principles of training and handling 
of troops and in the control and elaboration of army organization 
generally, the knowledge acquired bj^ previous study and application 
has been invaluable. Added to this have been the efficiency and 
smoothness of working resulting from standardization of principles, 
assisted in many cases by the previous personal acquaintance at the 
staff college of those called upon to work together in the field. 

The course of the war has brought out very clearly the value of an 
efficient and well-trained high command, in which I include not 
merely commanders of higher formations, but their staffs also. 

This has been the first time in our history that commanders have 
had to be provided for such large forces. Before the war, no one of 
our generals had commanded even an army corps such as has been 
used as a siibsidiary formation in the battles of the last few years. 
In consequence, commanders have been faced with problems very 
different to those presented by the small units with which they had 
been accustomed to train in peace. That they exercised their com- 
mands with such success as most of them did shows, I venture to 
think, that their prior training was based on sound principles and 
conducted on practical lines. 

Similarly as regards the staff, the magnitude of our operations 
introduced a situation for which no precedent existed. The staff 
colleges had only produced a reserve of staff officers adequate to the 
needs of our Army on a peace footing, and for the mobilization of 
the expeditionary force of six divisions. Consequently, on the expan- 
sion of the Army during the war many officers had to be recruited 
for staff appointments — from good regular officers chiefly, but also 
from officers of our new armies — and trained for the new duties re- 
quired of them. Though numbers of excellent staff officers were pro- 
vided in this way, it was found as a general rule that the relative 
effixiency in statj' duties of men who had passed through the staff 
colleges, as compared with men who had not had that advantage, 
was unquestionably greater. 

Good staff work is an essential to success in all wars, and particu- 
larly in a struggle of such magnitude as that through which we had 
just passed. No small part of the difficulty of achieving it lies in the 



FEATURES OF THE WAE. 25 

possibility that officers on the staff of higher formations may get out 
of touch with the fighting forces, and so lose sense of proportion and 
become unpractical. Every endeavor was made to avoid this by 
maintaining a constant interchange of such officers with others from 
the front, so that all might keep abreast with the latest ideas and 
experience both in the fighting line and elsewhere. In pursuance of 
this principle, in addition to 18 officers from army or corps staffs and 
other officers from the intelligence corps or general list, there were 
brought in during the period of my command some 50 officers direct 
from active duty with divisions or smaller units to hold for longer 
or shorter periods appointments in the general staff branch at gen- 
eral headquarters. 

It may be accepted as a general rule that previous organizations 
should be upset as little as possible in war. As each war has certain 
special conditions, so some modification of existing ideas and prac- 
tices will be necessary, but if our principles are sound these will be 
few and unimportant. In the present war new organizations and 
establishments for dealing with the demands of both the fighting and 
the rearward services have been brought into being continually, and 
added to or absorbed by our existing organization and establishment. 

The constant birth of new ideas has demanded the exercise of the 
greatest care, not only to insure that no device or suggestion of real 
value should be overlooked or discouraged, but also to regulate the 
enthusiasm of the specialist and prevent each new development as- 
suming dimensions out of proportion to its real value. As the result 
of our own experience and that of the French during the fighting of 
1915, all kinds of trench weapons were invented, bombs, bomb 
throwers, mortars, and even such instruments as trench daggers. In 
those days the opinion was freely expressed that the war would be 
finished in the trenches and every effort was made to win victories 
in the trenches themselves. In consequence, rifle shooting was for- 
gotten and was fast becoming a lost art. Similarly as regards artil- 
lery^, the idea of dominating and defeating the hostile artillery before 
proceeding to the infantry attack was considered an impossibility. 

Then followed the experience of the Battle of the Somme in" 1916, 
which showed that the principles of our prewar training were as 
sound as ever. That autumn a revival of old methods was inaugu- 
rated. Musketry shooting was everywhere carried out, and bayonet 
fighting was taught as the really certain Avay of gaining supremacy in 
hand-to-hand fighting. At the same time, as pointed out in para- 
graph IT above, the greatest care was devoted to artillery shootmg, 
as well as to the training of all arms for open fighting. The events 
of the next two years fully confirmed the lessons drawn from the 
Battle of the Somme. In short, the longer the war has lasted the 
more emphatically has it been realized that our original organization 
and training were based on correct principles. The danger of alter- 
ing them too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been 
greater than the risk of adjusting them too little. 

(22) Some idea of the extent of the organization built up during 
the war for the training of our armies can be gathered from a sur- 
vey of the different schools actually established. 

In the armies important schools were maintained for the instruc- 
tion of officers and noncommissioned officers of infantry and artillery 
in their several duties, for training in scouting, observation and 



26 FEATURES OF THE WAR. 

sniping, in the use of trench mortars, in signaling, musketry, and 
bayonet fighting, antigas precautions, mining, and defense against 
tanks. The different corps controlled a similar series of schools. 
Added to these were the special schools of the cavalry corps, in- 
cluding a school of equitation; the tank corps mechanical school; 
and the different courses instituted and managed by divisions, which 
were largely attended whenever the battle situation permitted. 

Other schools under the direct supervision of general headquarters 
provided instruction in the machine gun, Lewis gun and liglit mortar, 
in anticraft gunnery, in observation for artillery, in sound ranging 
and flash spotting, Avireless, bridging and other engineering duties, in 
firing and bombing from aeroplanes, and in physical and recreational 
training. At the base depots big training and reinforcement camps 
were set up for infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, machine gTin- 
ners, cyclists, tank corps, signal and gas personnel. Further, a 
regular succession of staff officers and others were sent home to take 
part in the various schools and courses established in England. 

In the course of the past year it was found desirable to make pro- 
vision for the more thorough coordination of effort among these 
various schools, and also for assisting commanders, especially during 
battle periods, in the training and instruction of such troops as 
might from time to time be in reserve. For this purpose an in- 
spectorate of training was established. Training and organization 
must always go hand in hand ; for while tactical considerations dictate 
the organization of units and methods of training, upon sound tactical 
organization and training depend the development and effective 
employment of good tactics. 

In the early spring of 1918 the foundations were laid of an educa- 
tional scheme which might give officers and men throughout the army 
an opportunity to prepare themselves for their return to civil life. 
Delayed in its application by the German offensive and the crowded 
events of the summer and autumn of that year, since the conclusion 
of the armistice the scheme has been developed with most excellent 
results under the general direction of the training subsection of my 
general staff branch, and generously supported in every possible way 
by the educational department at home. Divided into a general and a 
technical side every effort has been made both to give opportunities for 
the improvement of general knowledge and to enable trained men to 
" get their hands in " before returning to civil life. In this way be- 
tween 400,000 and 500,000 persons have been brought under instruc- 
tion, while the number" of attendances at lectures has approached a 
million in the course of a month. 

(23) The feature of the war which to the historian may well ap- 
pear the most noteworthy is the creation of our new armies. 

To have built up successfully in the very midst of war a great new 
army on a more than continental scale, capable of beating the best 
troops of the strongest military nation of prewar days, is an achieve- 
ment of which the whole Empire may be proud. The total of over 
327,000 German prisoners captured by us on the western front is in 
striking contrast to the force of six divisions, comprising some 80,000 
fighting men all told, with which we entered the war. That we 
should have been able to accomplish this stupendous task is due partly 
to the loyalty and devotion of our Allies and to the splendid work 



FEATURES OF THE WAE. 27 

of the Koyal Navy, but mainly to tlie wonderful spirit of tlie British 
race in all parts of the world. 

Discipline has never had such a vindication in any war as in the 
present one, and it is their discipline which most distinguishes our new 
armies from all similarlj'- created armies of the past. At the outset 
the lack of deep-seated and instinctive discipline placed our new 
troops at a disadvantage compared with the methodically trained 
enemy. This disadvantage, however, was overcome, and during the last 
two years the discipline of all ranks of our new armies, from what- 
ever part of the Empire they have come, was excellent. Born from a 
widespread and intelligent appreciation of the magnitude of the 
issues at stake and a firm belief in the justice of our cause, it drew 
strength and permanence from a common-sense recognition of what 
discipline really means — from a general realization that true disci- 
pline demands as much from officers as from men, and that without 
mutual trust, understanding, and confidence on the part of all ranks 
the highest form of discipline is impossible. 

Drawn "from every sphere of life, from every profession, depart- 
ment, and industry of the British Empire, and thrust suddenly into 
a totally new situation full of unknown difficulties, all ranks have de- 
voted their lives and energies to the service of their country in the 
whole-hearted manner which the magnitude of the issues warranted. 
The policy of putting complete trust in subordinate commanders and 
of allowing them a free hand in the choice of means to attain their 
object has proved most successful. Young officers, whatever their 
previous education may have been, have learned their duties with 
enthusiasm and speed, and have accepted their responsibilities un- 
flinchingly. 

Our universities and public schools throughout the Empire have 
proved once more, as they have proved time and again in the past, 
that in the formation of character, which is the root of discipline, 
they have no rivals. Not that universities and public schools enjoy a 
monopoly of the qualities which make good officers. The life of the 
British Empire generally has proved sound under the severest tests, 
and while giving men whom it is an honor for any officer to command, 
has furnished officers of the highest standard from all ranli:s of society 
and all quarters of the world. 

Promotion has been entirely by merit, and the highest appoint- 
ments were open to the humblest provided he had the necessary quali- 
fications of character, skill, and Imowledge. Many instances could be 
quoted of men who from civil or comparatively humble occupations 
have risen to important commands. A schoohnaster, a lawyer, a taxi- 
cab driver, and an ex-sergeant-major have commanded brigades; one 
editor has commanded a division, and another held successfully the 
position of senior staff officer to a regular division ; the undercook of 
a Cambridge college, a clerk to the metropolitan water board, an 
insurance clerk, an architect's assistant, and a police inspector became 
efficient general staff officers; a mess sergeant, a railway signalman, 
a coal miner, a market gardener, an assistant secretary to a haber- 
dasher's company, a quartermaster-sergeant, and many private sol- 
diers have risen to command battalions ; clerks have commanded bat- 
teries; a schoolmaster, a collier, the son of a blacksmith, an iron 
molder, an instructor in tailoring, an assistant gas engineer, a grocer's 



2 b FEATURES OF THE ^VAR. 

assistant, as well as policemen, clerks and privates, have commanded 
companies or acted as adjutants. 

As a body, and with few exceptions, new officers have understood 
that the care of their men must be their first consideration, that their 
men's comforts and well-being should at all times come before their 
own, that without this they can not expect to win the affection, con- 
fidence, loyalty, and obedience of those they are privileged to com- 
mand, or to draw the best from them. Moreover, they have known 
how to profit by the experience of others, and in common with their 
men they have turned willingly to the members of the old regular 
army for instruction and guidance in all branches of their new way 
of life. 

On their part, officers, noncommissioned officers, and men of the 
old regular army have risen to the demands made upon them in a 
manner equally marvelous. Their leaven has pervaded the whole of 
the mighty force which in four and one-half years of war has gath- 
ered from all parts of the world round the small, highly trained army 
with which we entered the war. The general absence of jealousy and 
the readiness to learn, which in the field has markedly characterized 
all ranks of our new armies, is proof both of the quality of our old 
army and of the soundness of our prewar training. If further proof 
were needed, it is found in the wonderful conduct and achievements 
of our armies, new and old, and in the general pride with which they 
are universally regarded. 

In the earlier stages of the war the regular army was called on to 
provide instructors and cadres round which the new armies could be 
formed. All that was best in the old regular army, its discipline, 
based on force of character, leadership, and mutual respect, its tra- 
ditions, and the spirit that never knows defeat have been the founda- 
tions on which the new armies have been built up. Heavy demands 
were necessarily made upon our establishment of trained regular 
officers, most regrettably depleted by the heavy sacrifices of the early 
days of the war. The way in which such demands have been met by 
those who survived those days has justified our belief in them. 

Neither have the officers of the new armies, whether drawn from 
the British Isles or the Dominions, risen with less spirit and success 
to the needs of the occasion. The great expansion of the army, and 
the length of the war, necessitated an ever-increasing demand being 
made on them for filling responsible positions in command, staff, and 
administrative appointments. The call has been met most efficiently. 
The longer the war continued, the greater became the part played in 
it by the new armies of the Empire. 



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